The Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) was created in 2006 with wideranging powers to protect human rights, promote equal opportunities and encourage mutual respect between different groups. Alongside the Commission, individuals, through the courts and sector-specific enforcers (such as ombudsmen and regulators), have also been given equality and human rights enforcement powers. Within this enforcement landscape, the Commission has struggled to craft an enforcement role for itself. For the first time, this article, through the mapping of these different actors in their shared regulatory space, outlines a role for the EHRC in equality and human rights enforcement.
INTRODUCTION
The Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) was created in 2006 to merge the Equal Opportunities Commission, the Commission for Racial Equality and the Disability Rights Commission (the legacy Commissions).
The establishment of a single commission was intended to utilise the expertise of the legacy commissions to take a
In contrast, the third and current iteration of the Commission (under the chairship of David Isaac) has placed a heavier emphasis on ensuring compliance ('keen for the Commission to focus more on the use of its legal powers…we should become a more muscular regulator'). 24 This issue takes on added importance in the context of the significant budget cuts the Commission has undertaken and heavy public scrutiny it has endured.
Unfortunately, there is currently no clear conception of what a strategic role for the EHRC looks like. This is because the majority of research on equality and human rights 23 EHRC, Strategic plan 2012-15 (Stationary Office 2012) 8, 11. 24 D Isaac Prioritising our legal work (2017), available at https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/ourwork/blogs/prioritising-our-legal-work; D Isaac 10 years on: the fight is far from over (2017), available at https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/our-work/blogs/prioritising-our-legal-work.
enforcement focuses upon (private) individual enforcement through the courts. 25 In contrast, research on other (public) enforcement mechanisms (particularly the EHRC) is sparse. 26 This article begins to tackle this research gap by outlining a role for the Commission in equality and human rights enforcement. It does this by utilising the concept of regulatory space to explore the roles of the major equality and human rights enforcement actors, courts and sector-specific enforcers (the latter is used in the article to refer collectively to regulators, inspectorates, and ombudsmen), through which it is possible to observe enforcement spaces that the EHRC can fill (ie act strategically to add value). By taking this approach, it is argued that the enforcement role of the EHRC consists of three primary tasks: (1) carrying out enforcement action that the other actors are unable to perform; (2) overcoming some of the limitations of individual enforcement via the courts; and (3)
coordinating and supporting sector-specific enforcers. At the same time as elucidating an enforcement role for the EHRC, the article also intends to shed light on the utility of looking beyond the courts when exploring the enforcement of equality and human rights law. The article is divided into three sections. The first section briefly explains the concept of regulatory space and justifies its use in relation to equality and human rights enforcement bodies. The second section then examines the roles of two of the major types of enforcement body (courts and sector-specific enforcers) particularly focusing on the enforcement tasks these bodies are unable, or ill-suited, to fulfil and the enforcement spaces these create. Through outlining these spaces, the final section constructs a strategic enforcement role for the Commission and illustrates how, building on the existing practices of the EHRC, this role can be accomplished.
REGULATORY SPACE
The concept of regulatory space was introduced by Hancher and Moran in the context of economic regulation to challenge the traditional orthodox hierarchical view of regulation. 27 This orthodox view regarded regulation as state enacted legal rules enforced by a single state regulator against private regulatees. 28 In contrast, regulatory space attempts to capture the increasingly complex reality of regulation. It uses the metaphor of space to recognise that regulation is an area available for occupation by different actors. In this way, in divergence to the orthodox view, regulation is seen as not just consisting of a hierarchical relationship between a regulator and regulatees but also includes a wide range of other interested actors (eg individuals, charities, non-governmental organisations, state bodies) that also possess regulatory resources to various degrees. By using the concept of open space, Hancher and Moran recognise that the habitation of the regulatory field is open to dispute by different bodies so that the task of regulation is not necessarily evenly divided between actors and roles emerge via struggle (ie there will be major and minor participants in the regulatory process). 30 This better fits modern experiences of regulation as it recognises that, rather than being concentrated in a single body, regulatory power and resources are increasingly being dispersed between different bodies. 31 This dispersal of power and resources, and consequently the creation of regulatory space, is generally not a conscious deliberate act, it develops over time, on a piecemeal basis, as different governments alter the powers of different bodies and establish new bodies with new functions. 32 Therefore, in order to understand regulation in a particular sector, investigators need to focus on the whole configuration of resources and relations within the shared regulatory space (ie the identity of the bodies within regulatory space, the roles they fulfil and the interactions between them). 33 Since the introduction of the concept of regulatory space by Hancher and Moran, regulatory theory has been expanded in two significant ways that are relevant to this article. The first is the extension to public bodies. body) thought to be largely ineffective. 34 More recently, work by Hood and colleagues has shown that regulation inside government is a big and diverse business and can be more effective than originally thought. 35 This is important as, although enforcement of equality and human rights does involve public bodies regulating private organisations (eg the EHRC regulating employers), it also heavily involves public bodies regulating other public bodies (such as sector-specific enforcers regulating schools and hospitals).
A second expansion of regulatory space has been its extension to social regulation. The concept was originally introduced in the domain of economic regulation and its early uses were in this context, 36 however, the concept's increasing relevance to social regulation has been recognised. 37 This ties in with the increasing trend in the regulation literature to expand the field of regulation to include social regulation. 38 This has seen the use of regulatory space extended to areas of social regulation such as state contracting-out of public services and genetic databases. 39 Thus, when the concept of regulatory space was originally devised, it was unlikely to be envisaged that it would be applicable to the enforcement of equality and human rights law. Yet, the concept is particularly appropriate 34 J Q Wilson and P Rachal, 'Can the government regulate itself? ' (1977) in the context of equality and human rights enforcement. This is because it better captures the distinction in equality and human rights enforcement between ensuring compliance (conformity to legal rules) and promoting implementation (going beyond formal legal rules to mainstream equality and human rights). 40 Traditionally, researchers have concentrated heavily on compliance through court enforcement and this has acted to obscure compliance and implementation through a wide range of others actors (such as the EHRC, sector-specific enforcers, NGOs, business groups, charities, companies and individuals). Thus it is argued and will be illustrated throughout the article, that the concept of regulatory space better captures the reality of equality and human rights enforcement than only focusing on the outcomes of private individual enforcement in courts.
THE REGULATORY SPACE OF EQUALITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
It was argued in the previous section that in order to effectively understand a regulatory space and hence regulation in a particular sector, there is a need to explore the roles of different bodies within regulatory space and to examine the relationships between these bodies. Once the roles and relationships between regulatory bodies are visible, it is possible to make suggestions about how their capacities can be enhanced or constrained to re-adjust relations between them to improve regulation within the sector. Therefore, this section of the article focuses on the roles of different bodies within the regulatory space of equality and human rights exploring the enforcement tasks they fulfil, and crucially the tasks they are ill-suited or unable to perform. Through undertaking this task, an enforcement role for the EHRC becomes visible. While there is a range of actors within the regulatory space of equality and human rights (such as NGOs, business groups, charities, companies, and individuals) due to limits of space the article focuses on the three key actors within the shared regulatory space: the courts, sector-specific enforcers, and the EHRC. Third, enforcement via judicial determination is heavily hampered by individuation.
Private enforcement through the courts
Private enforcement requires both an individual who has been harmed to bring a claim and there to be an identifiable defendant who can be blamed. 51 In many cases though, harmed individuals may be unable or unwilling to commence legal action. In theory,
anyone is entitled to access the court system, but in reality, litigation is time-consuming and costly, which acts as a barrier for many potential litigants. 52 Even if there is a willing and able claimant, the complex nature of inequality and human rights means that there may be no individual or organisation that can readily be blamed resulting in the issue going unchallenged. 53 Furthermore, in some cases individuals may not know they have been harmed, believing barriers to be normal or justified (eg a job advert that requires applicants to work full-time when in reality the job could be performed part-time). 54 Consequently, the situations in which equality and human rights issues can be judicially determined are actually quite narrow. Finally, in order to hear equality and human rights claims courts are reliant on rights being justiciable, which in a dualist system such as the UK requires incorporation within domestic law. It should be noted that these constraints need not be fatal, with many commentators arguing that they can and should be overcome. For instance, it would be possible to widen standing, make claims less financially risky for applicants and introduce a wider range of justiciable human rights. 57 However, while accepting courts are not as effective as they could be, this article is focused on a different task. While we should not give up on advocating greater access to justice through the courts, the reality is that even if there were substantial reforms to enhance individual enforcement mechanisms, there would still be enforcement gaps that courts could not fill (for example they could still not take the wide perspective of other bodies or adequately monitor remedies). Consequently, there is a need to examine the enforcement role of other bodies (primarily sector-specific enforcers and the EHRC) in the regulatory space of equality and human rights.
Sector-specific enforcement
Alongside the judiciary, sector-specific enforcers have also been given responsibility to address equality and human rights issues. Under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, public authorities (which includes regulators, inspectorates, and ombudsmen) must inspectorates, and ombudsmen as being subject to the duty. Additionally, some enforcers are explicitly required to take equality and human rights concerns into account when discharging their functions. For example, the Care Quality Commission (CQC) is required to have regard to the need to protect and promote the rights of people who use health and social care services. 58 As a result of these provisions, sector-specific enforcers are required to take account of equality and human rights in their decisions and inspections.
In terms of equality and human rights enforcement, sector-specific enforcers can overcome many of the limitations of (or fill the gaps left by) judicial determination. O'Brien outlines that in contrast to courts, ombudsmen are informal, free to both parties, relatively quick and more relaxed in terms of procedures and application of legal principles. 59
Sector-specific enforcers are also able to offer greater flexibility in terms of remedies with their decisions generally being revisable and with them being able to draw upon their experiences to craft effective remedies with 'systemic bite'. 60 In addition, they are also better suited to continually monitor remedial action to correct equality/human rights by multiple enforcers can also result in equality and human rights concerns being overlooked as one enforcer believes another enforcer is tackling those issues.
A further restriction is that most sector-specific enforcers have very limited knowledge of the requirements of equality and human rights law. While equality and human rights issues may be prominent in the specific sector, the primary role of sector-specific enforcers is not equality and human rights enforcement. The staff at each enforcer are appointed for their skills and expertise related to the primary role and therefore will generally lack knowledge about equality and human rights requirements.
Consequentially, however willing they may be, the lack of legal knowledge makes it difficult for sector-specific enforcers to enforce equality and human rights issues within their work. This was seen in a report by the Office for Public Management (OPM) into the role and experience of sector-specific enforcers in incorporating human rights into their work, which found that while there was commitment to human rights at an organisational level, at an individual level knowledge was very limited, with individuals unsure of the content of human rights, the requirements of the Human Rights Act, and the relevance of human rights to their day-to-day roles. 64 A final limitation, linked to sector-specific enforcers' lack of knowledge about equality and human rights, is the distance of enforcers from judicial determinations. Given that equality and human rights enforcement is not their primary role, sector-specific enforcers are less likely to keep up to date with current equality and human rights jurisprudence. Thus, the OPM report also found that respondents varied in the extent that they felt that they should keep up to date with human rights jurisprudence and their awareness of how they could do this. 65 Not keeping up to date with the law can potentially lead to sector-specific enforcers overlooking clear breaches of the law or accidentally encouraging those subject to enforcement to engage in unlawful actions. This is especially so given that the majority of OPM respondents lacked awareness of whether changes in human rights law fed back into the enforcers' policies and practices. 66 The proximity of enforcers to those subject to their enforcement mean that regulatees are much more likely to follow the requirements of enforcers than formal legal requirements (of which they may have little knowledge or understanding). 67 This disconnect between sector-specific enforcer practice and current jurisprudence significantly hampers effective equality and human rights enforcement.
In summary, sector-specific enforcers can fulfil some of the enforcement gaps left by the courts (they can deal with equality and human rights issues beyond a specific individual case, they do not have to set institutional limits, they can provide wider remedies, do not generally require specific individuals to claim/be blamed and can more easily deal with unincorporated rights). However, there are also numerous drawbacks to sector-specific enforcement (ie enforcement disparities between enforcers, an overall lack of knowledge of equality and human rights standards and significant distance from formal court decisions). As with individual enforcement through the courts, the limitations of sectorspecific enforcement do not have to be fatal to the effective protection of equality and 65 ibid 33. 66 ibid. 67 ibid 58.
human rights law, as the EHRC still has a role to play in the shared regulatory space of equality and human rights. It is to this role that the rest of the article now turns.
THE ROLE OF THE EQUALITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
The previous section outlined the roles of two types of key actors (the courts and sectorspecific enforcers) within the regulatory space of equality and human rights. As was outlined in the first section, once an understanding of the roles of actors within regulatory space is gained, effective regulation is achieved by enhancing or constraining the capacities of different bodies. Yet, in relation to the enforcement of equality and human rights, the roles of the courts and sector-specific enforcers are unlikely to be enhanced and if anything, are more likely to be constrained (eg if the Human Rights Act is repealed without being replaced). Therefore, the positions of courts and sector-specific enforcers within the regulatory space of equality and human rights are largely fixed. This makes the role of the EHRC within the regulatory space take on added importance, as its wideranging powers mean that it can adopt an enforcement role as wide (such as re-inspecting all regulatees already inspected by sector-specific enforcers) or as narrow (only issuing guidance to actors) as necessary to fill the enforcement gaps.
Given the concerns with the performance of the EHRC, it is important that the Commission adopts an effective role for itself within the regulatory space of equality law and human rights, to avoid having its capacities further constrained by the Government.
It was seen in the previous section that the courts and sector-specific enforcers discharge a number of key enforcement tasks (eg the courts elucidate and expand the law and sector-specific enforcers tackle potential harm before it occurs). Both bodies are also able to carry out some tasks that the other body is unable to successfully complete (for example courts can adopt a consistent approach to the law that applies across different sectors and sector-specific enforcers can utilise non-incorporated rights in their enforcement work thereby giving them effect in Britain). However, there are still a number of tasks that are not effectively performed by either the courts or sector-specific enforcers (such as wide-ranging monitoring of the effectiveness of the law across society) and constraints on the abilities of both to act effectively that are not always corrected by the other type of body (such as difficulties of individuals accessing a court and sector-specific enforcers lacking knowledge of equality and human rights standards). Through these observations it is possible to outline an effective role for the EHRC that consists of three primary tasks: (1) carrying out enforcement action that courts and sector-specific enforcers are unable to perform; (2) overcoming some of the limitations of individual enforcement via the courts; and (3) coordinating and supporting sector-specific enforcers.
The remainder of the article will now expand on these tasks and illustrate how they can effectively be performed by the Commission.
Carrying out enforcement action that courts and sector-specific enforcers are unable to perform
The first key aspect of the EHRC's role is undertaking enforcement action that courts and sector-specific enforcers are unable to perform. The Commission can use its full range of powers to fulfil this role, but particularly useful are the powers of monitoring (on both the effectiveness of equality and human rights law and progress in society) and ability to launch inquiries to compensate for the limitations of enforcement via judicial determination and sector-specific enforcement, primarily by taking enforcement action at a society-wide level (or at least at a multi-sector level). 68 Whereas courts are limited to the issue before them so cannot tackle systemic issues and, sector-specific enforcers can only focus on issues within their sector which means they may miss or inconsistently tackle multi-sector issues, the EHRC can highlight and tackle equality and rights concerns at a societal level. The Commission has recognised the importance of this task (with it being one of its principles for prioritising issues) and has taken a number of actions to tackle societal and cross-sector issues. 69 One key programme of work is monitoring, with the Commission constructing a monitoring framework and undertaking triennial reviews to assess the state of equality and human rights implementation in Britain. 70 Although there are other actors that could undertake aspects of this monitoring work (such as sector-specific enforcers and civil society organisations), the EHRC is uniquely placed to take a detailed and pan-societal approach to monitoring.
Another key mechanism for the Commission to undertake unique enforcement actions is through inquiries. For example, it has undertaken an inquiry into disability-related harassment. 71 While it is possible for individuals to challenge the harassment they have experienced through the courts and sector-specific enforcers to address harassment within their sector, both bodies are unable to capture the wide-ranging and systemic 68 The Commission could also use some of its other powers here such as investigations (although inquiries are much wider and therefore likely to prove more cost effective) and providing information (which is often follows monitoring and inquiries nature of this harassment, with the EHRC being in a much better position to investigate concerns. In addition, the EHRC is undertaking work to ensure equality and human rights are protected after the UK leaves the EU. 72 Although judicial determination and sectorspecific enforcers could address aspects of this work they are unable to take the broad and uniform approach that the EHRC can. Furthermore, there are situations where neither the courts (because there is no organisation with alleged responsibility) or sectorspecific enforcers (because there is no relevant sector-specific enforcer) can take action, and thus the EHRC is best placed to act. This can be seen with the Commission's inquiry into diversity on FTSE 350 boardrooms, where although there is a lack of diversity there is often no obvious act of discrimination that can be challenged in a court and there is no sector-specific enforcer. 73 While the Commission has begun to carry out enforcement actions that courts and sectorspecific enforcers have been unable to perform, its work in this area has been hampered by the significant budget cuts that it has endured, which has meant that the Commission has had to seriously change the way it operates. Thus, the threshold for conducting inquiries has now been set at a high level so they will be undertaken much less frequently. 74 However, budgetary cuts have also had some advantages on how the Commission conducts inquiries. For instance, the EHRC has significantly streamlined its monitoring framework making it easier and less costly to undertake the triennial review.
Prior to having its budget cut, the Commission had four different measurement 72 which both enforcers had responsibility for. In the period after its budget was cut the Commission has recognised the need to use its remaining budget effectively by acting strategically and avoiding duplication and has thus placed significant weight on partnership with sector-specific enforcers (discussed in more detail below). 79 Since this change in approach the only inquiry that the EHRC has undertaken where sector-specific enforcers also had enforcement power was a cross-sector inquiry (which, as outlined earlier, no sector-specific enforcer could adequately address individually) on preventing deaths in detention of adults with mental health conditions, and all relevant sector-specific enforcers were involved in the inquiry. 80 Thus in relation to this aspect of the Commission's role, the approach of the EHRC would appear to conform with the findings of Sarah Spencer and Colin Harvey's wider study of UK and Irish equality and human rights institutions that while resources 'are essential to carry out some functions; hence, the budget has a bearing on performance…a tight budget can encourage a strategic use of the levers available'. 81 This would appear to be the case here as while large budget cuts have restricted the Commission's ability to act which has curtailed its enforcement potential (for example, budget cuts have restricted the number of inquiries the EHRC can undertake), it has caused the Commission to act more strategically. The EHRC has done this by focusing its enforcement actions to ensure they are as effective as they can be, through streamlining its monitoring mechanisms and engaging in multi-agency working. 
Overcoming some of the limitations of individual enforcement via the courts
Within the shared regulatory space of equality and human rights, the courts and the EHRC have been given distinct but closely related roles. The courts and the EHRC can work independently without a failure of the equality and human rights enforcement regime, but enforcement will be most effective when they cooperate. Through judicial determination of equality and human rights claims, courts can provide the EHRC with important legal frameworks, which the Commission can utilise to improve the protection and promotion of equality and human rights. 83 The EHRC, in turn, can utilise its powers to work with courts to overcome some of the limitations of judicial determination and thus improve the ability of courts to hear equality and human rights cases. It was seen earlier that a potential limitation of judicial determination is difficulties with access to the courts. The legal assistance in specific equality cases, or institute legal proceedings themselves. 84 Additionally, while courts are typically limited in the information they have before them, the Commission can use its power to intervene in legal proceedings to provide information to courts to improve the evidence basis that courts have before them when making decisions.
In terms of the relationship between courts and the EHRC, interaction takes place solely in the courtroom when the EHRC either institute or intervene in legal proceedings. This results in the courts and the EHRC being in a principal-agent relationship, with the court as the principal and the EHRC as the agent. 85 As the principal, the courts exert considerable control over the EHRC within their shared regulatory space, determining if it can institute/intervene in legal proceedings, the extent of the Commission's intervention and the weight placed upon the Commission's submissions. As an agent, to play an effective enforcement role, the EHRC needs to comply with the wishes of the court. In a study of interventions in the Supreme Court of Canada, Alarie and Green outline three functions interventions can serve: (i) providing objectively useful information to the court;
(ii) providing the 'best' argument for certain partisan interests; and (iii) allowing interveners to have their voices heard. 86 As an agent, to positively influence judicial determinations on equality and human rights issues, the EHRC needs to fulfil the needs of the courts. The courts are concerned with resolving the direct legal dispute and therefore want the EHRC in its interventions to fulfil the first function (ie provide objectively useful information). As Baroness Hale states, 'interveners are, or should be there to provide us with evidence and arguments with which, for whatever reason, the parties are unlikely or unable to provide us, so that…we can get a more rounded picture of the problem'. 87 Therefore, if the EHRC is to work effectively with the courts, it needs to fulfil the first function of interveners and provide the courts with objectively useful information.
There are two main obstacles that currently inhibit the Commission overcoming some of the constraints of judicial enforcement through the courts. The first, seen in the previous part, is the impact of the heavy budget cuts. This has meant the EHRC, in its second iteration under the chairship of Onora O'Neill, became much less ambitious, only using its legal powers as a last resort. 88 Consequently, the Commission moved away from providing legal advice and legal assistance, recognising that there were other organisations in society who provided these services and instead placed increased emphasis on (the more cost-effective) intervention in ongoing legal proceedings. 89 The second obstacle, relating to interventions, is that the EHRC is not currently performing the task it has been allotted by the courts. By examining cases where the EHRC has intervened it can be seen that, while courts want the Commission to provide objectively useful information, the Commission is instead providing the best argument for partisan interests. 90 Thus, Baroness Hale argues that 'from the point of view of the court it can sometimes be difficult to disentangle the private interests of the client from the broader public interests of the Commission'. 91 This can often put courts and the EHRC into conflict resulting in courts often ignoring, or placing limited weight, upon the Commission's interventions. For example, in Slack, the appeals took on a more complicated form due to the issues being transformed by the intervention of the EHRC who introduced a range of fresh legal arguments. 92 In Bracking (No. 2) the EHRC tried to encourage the judge to read a report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Human
Rights, yet the judge refrained as it did not sound particularly useful, it was unlikely to help decide the issues in the case and there was a very real danger of infringing the rules on Parliamentary privilege. 93 Finally in Smith the EHRC was criticised by Lord Collins in the Supreme Court for encouraging the judge in an earlier stage of the proceedings to answer a question which, although the Commission deemed it of general significance and importance, was academic to the facts of the case: 'There is an obvious danger in giving what are in substance advisory opinions on hypothetical facts divorced from any concrete factual situation'. 94 Consequently, in order to be more successful in this area, rather than providing the best arguments for partisan interests, the Commission needs to focus on providing courts with objectively useful information. This is particularly important in light of section 87 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, which requires interveners to pay some or all of the parties' costs (unless there are exceptional circumstances) if the intervener has acted in substance as the main party, the intervener's evidence and representations have not been of significant assistance to the court or a significant part relates to matters that are not necessary for the court to consider, or the intervener has behaved unreasonably.
Therefore, rather than just having its interventions ignored, the EHRC could now find that there are significant cost implications if it continues with its current approach, reducing its budget even further.
Given that the Commission is wanting to obtain favourable rulings from courts to help with its other enforcement activities (such as promoting greater compliance and implementation) it is perhaps unreasonable to expect it to fulfil the implementation role desired by courts and provide objectively useful information. Consequently, rather than intervening in cases, if the EHRC is going to continue to advance their own partisan interests, it would be better to focus on providing legal assistance or instituting proceedings itself. The third iteration of the Commission (under the chairship of David Isaacs) is working towards this and expanding the number of cases it assists, which should be encouraged. 95 However, a limitation in this area is that the Commission is only 95 D Isaac Prioritising our legal work (2017), available at https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/ourwork/blogs/prioritising-our-legal-work; EHRC Legal Support Project: helping people to get legal assistance (2017), available at https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/legal-casework/legal-supportproject-helping-people-get-legal-assistance.
able to provide legal assistance for equality claims and not human rights claims. This might not seem particularly problematic because the EHRC can institute human rights claims in its own name, yet this is far from ideal in situations where there is a willing but poorly resourced applicant, as it forces the Commission to take over the applicant's case, which acts to take control and autonomy away from the victim, further disempowering them. Consequently, the EHRC would benefit from having its powers to provide legal assistance extended to also cover human rights to avoid these sorts of situation.
Coordinating and supporting sector-specific enforcers
In relation to the EHRC and sector-specific enforcers, the powers of both mean they are engaged in a redundancy model of enforcement with both possessing overlapping functions. 96 This means that both the EHRC and sector-specific enforcers can take identical enforcement action, such as publish information, issue codes of practice, undertake investigations and assess compliance with the public sector equality duty.
However, given the wide-ranging nature of equality and human rights regulation and the Commission's reduced budget, it would be impossible for the EHRC to regulate all organisations in society. Consequently, rather than simply repeating the enforcement actions of sector-specific enforcers, to be most effective the EHRC would benefit from using its powers in this area to overcome the limitations of sector-specific enforcement - Lenoble and Maesschalck outline four approaches to learning, all of which operate on a continuum, progressively expanding the conditions for the success of learning. 99 The attainment of maximum learning requires a combination of all four approaches. 100 The first approach is neo-institutionalist, which rather than imposing arbitrary external conditions on organisations, requires that the external conditions that are imposed are optimal (ie the most effective they can be). 101 For the EHRC and sector-specific enforcers this would mean that, rather than imposing the Commission's preferred method of enforcement on sector-specific enforcers and expecting enforcers to carry this out, the Commission instead considers which methods of enforcement would be the 'best fit' for each sector-specific enforcer to achieve compliance and promote implementation within their sector. The Commission would then learn from the performance of sector-specific enforcers how the methods of enforcement and 'fit' of these to particular enforcers could be improved in the future. Although expanding on principal-agent and control approaches to cooperation, the neo-institutionalist approach is not sufficient on its own to establish full learning as the approach does not ensure that those who apply the conditions (ie sector-specific enforcers) do so in the same spirit as those who imposed the conditions (ie the EHRC) and thus the effects may be different from those envisaged. Consequently, the second approach is deliberative and builds on the neo-institutionalist approach by recognising that organisations that implement externally imposed conditions are affected in how they enact those conditions by their own internal mechanisms and thus there is a need to act on these mechanisms to improve implementation.
Consequently, under the deliberative approach learning takes place through different actors sharing their unique perspectives about the best way to undertake collective action. 102 This would involve the EHRC and sector-specific enforcers engaging in discussions about how sector-specific enforcers could best incorporate equality and human rights considerations into their work. In this way, both the Commission and enforcers learn about enforcement within specific sectors. Nevertheless, learning is still constrained as deliberation takes place within pre-determined power dynamics and actors often lack the capacities to effectively engage in deliberation. With some sector-specific enforcers (perhaps those that lack confidence around equality and human rights or that are newly created) it is likely that the EHRC will dominate discussions as enforcers will lack the capacities (such as knowledge, experience, confidence and resources) to engage in discussions on equal terms. However, in other cases (perhaps where enforcers are large and long-established) it is likely that the enforcer will dominate discussions and the Commission will lack capacities (eg tradition and reputation) to fully engage in discussions. In both situations, deliberation will be inhibited by unequal power dynamics.
The third, pragmatic approach aims to overcome the restrictions of the deliberative approach. It does this by encouraging actors to engage in a process of joint inquirythus discussions are truly open and all organisations contribute to, and should learn from, the inquiry. All actors are involved in designing solutions, monitoring performance and adjusting solutions accordingly. The process is experimentalist as new solutions create new problems so learning is a continuous process where there is permanent revisions and testing. 103 This would require the EHRC and sector-specific enforcers to jointly consider how equality and human rights could best be enforced within a specific sector, to jointly design methods of enforcement and to jointly assess the success of these methods. On the basis of this process, both the Commission and the enforcers would learn about different methods and improve their approaches in future. Yet, even if actors are equal partners in deliberation, they can still lack the capacities to engage in the joint inquiry in reality. Thus, other proponents of the pragmatist approach argue that the preexisting frames need also to be questioned. 104 Actors need to be made aware that when they engage in joint action they bring 'baggage' with them which inhibits their ability to learn. This 'baggage' includes past experiences, past discussions, beliefs and biases which can (often unconsciously) influence how actors view 'facts', understand situations what capacities contributed to these identities) and then re-imagining ways to act collectively in the future that are not constrained by the existing frames. 105 In this way actors are truly free to learn without constraints and thus can most effectively engage in joint inquiries to tackle collective problems.
In order to successfully coordinate and support sector-specific enforcers, the EHRC needs to facilitate mutual learning, where sector-specific enforcers learn how to best incorporate equality and human rights into their work and the Commission learns how best to support and coordinate enforcers. As outlined above, learning is optimised under the genetic approach to learning. In the absence of detailed empirical work exploring interactions between the EHRC and enforcers, it is not possible to outline which approaches actors are currently undertaking and how they could move along the continuum to deeper approaches to learning. Instead, a few outline observations will be shared.
The Commission does appear to have moved away from the principal-agent model of cooperation and moved towards more learning based approaches, and aspects of the neo-institutionalist, deliberative and pragmatist approaches can all be observed. In the first two strategic plans, although speaking of cooperation, the Commission outlined how it would work 'with and through' existing sector-specific enforcers suggesting that enforcers were a means to an end (ie they would be used to reach a wider range of organisations) and of helping enforcers fulfil 'their own obligations' strongly suggesting that incorporating equality and human rights into their work is something that enforcers are obliged to do. 106 In the more recent strategies (2015-16 and 2016-19) there is a softening of language with talk of collaborating with sector-specific enforcers to embed equality and human rights into their approaches to improve public services. 107 This demonstrates a move away from control approaches and has been supplemented with models of working that encourage learning. For instance, the EHRC's 2014-15 Business Plan spoke of testing and disseminating models for embedding equality and human rights inspection work to enforcers which suggests a neo-institutionalist approach (where the best external models are imposed on enforcers). 108 The Commission also chairs a regulator, inspectorate and ombudsmen (RIO) forum which meets quarterly to share knowledge and experiences around human rights and equality practices. This resulted in a report being produced that promotes the best practice of different enforcers. 109 This would be an illustration of the deliberative approach to learning where enforcers discuss ways to address a shared goal (ensuring greater compliance with and implementation of equality and human rights).
The Commission has also begun to establish relationships with individual enforcers, although the relationships between the EHRC and specific enforcers vary. For example, while the Commission intended to have a close working relationship with the school's regulator, Ofsted, a memorandum of understanding has not been concluded between the two organisations and Ofsted makes little or no reference to equality and human rights law and standards in its inspection literature. 110 This is despite equality and human rights being intrinsic to Ofsted's inspection framework (eg the right to education, the right for children to express their views, freedom of expression). In contrast, the EHRC has a close working relationship with the Care Quality Commission (CQC). The EHRC has entered into a memorandum of understanding through which the CQC and the EHRC committed to work together to improve equality and human rights in health and adult social care services. 111 This has resulted in the Commission and CQC issuing joint guidance on equality and human rights for CQC inspectors and assessors which outlines what equality and human rights issues inspectors should consider when inspecting different aspects of the inspection framework. 112 The EHRC has also funded equality and human rights training for all CQC staff provided by the British Institute of Human Rights. 113 This suggests a more pragmatic approach to learning where both the EHRC and CQC engage in joint inquiries (ie how best to embed equality and human rights into CQC inspection frameworks and to train inspectors and assessors). As stated above, this needs to be explored empirically, but it does suggest that the Commission is beginning to engage in activities that facilitate learning and thus improve the capacity of some, if not all, enforcers to embed equality and human rights considerations into their work, and this is something that should be extended by the EHRC in the future.
CONCLUSION
The article began by arguing that the metaphor of regulatory space could be utilised to capture the reality of equality and human rights enforcement. Through the use of regulatory space, the roles of two key types of enforcement body (courts and sectorspecific enforcers) were explored, particularly focusing on the enforcement tasks that both bodies are unable, or ill-suited, to fulfil. It was seen when examining the role of courts that, although their decisions have greater legitimacy and they are in a better position to elucidate/expand the law, there are certain enforcement tasks they are ill-suited to perform including dealing with equality and human rights issues beyond the immediate case, providing wide-ranging transformative remedies, addressing issues where there is which are explicitly incorporated into domestic law. For sector-specific enforcers, it was seen that they are able to fulfil many of these tasks (they can deal with issues beyond individual cases and are not reliant on individuals, can provide remedies and can address unincorporated rights into their work). However, sector-specific enforcers are unable to ensure a uniform approach to equality and human rights enforcement across society as they can only address concerns within their specific sector, they traditionally lack knowledge and expertise of equality and human rights and are fairly distant from court jurisprudence.
By focusing on the tasks that courts and sector-specific enforcers are unable/ill-suited to fulfil it was possible to outline a role for the Commission in equality and human rights enforcement. This role includes three primary tasks: (1) carrying out enforcement action that courts and sector-specific enforcers are unable to perform (ie wide-ranging societywide/multi-sector enforcement); (2) overcoming some of the limitations of courts (eg providing advice/legal assistance to enable individuals to access the courts or intervening in proceedings to provide the court with a wider evidence base); and (3) coordinating and supporting sector-specific enforcers in their enforcement work (ie share knowledge to build up their human rights capabilities and ensure consistent enforcement practices between enforcers).
This role does not require a radical reconfiguration of the EHRC in which it totally redefines the activities it undertakes but rather requires the Commission to focus on some activities more heavily than others and to more greatly pursue certain forms of working.
Specifically, the Commission needs to place a heavy focus on tasks it is uniquely placed to undertake (such as monitoring and inquiries) given that there are no other bodies who can complete this work, and particularly to engage in multi-agency work where possible to minimise the use of scarce resources. In relation to the Commission's legal powers, the Commission needs to move away from intervening in cases (due to their inability to be objective) to providing legal assistance directly or instituting proceedings themselves.
Finally, the Commission needs to continue to develop conditions that facilitate mutual learning with sector-specific enforcers and consider ways to expand existing work in this area. Alongside greater focus by the Commission, the role outlined also suggests additional financial resources from the government are justified to fund activities that no other bodies can adequately fulfil, such as inquiries, as otherwise there is a danger that significant equality and human rights issues are overlooked. Finally, the role supports the expansion of the Commission's legal powers to include assisting human rights cases (as it can currently only assist equality cases) otherwise the EHRC is reliant on instituting human rights proceedings itself, which can be disempowering for victims.
In addition to outlining a role for the EHRC in equality and human rights enforcement, the article has also had the wider aim of illustrating, and hopefully encouraging further research on, equality and human rights enforcement beyond the courts. This is particularly important given the extremely small number of equality and human rights infringements that make it to the courts (in the education context there are only twentytwo reported cases concerning discrimination in state schools since 1983). 114 The continued heavy focus on compliance in courts obscures the important role of other bodies in ensuring compliance and implementation (such as the EHRC and sectorspecific enforcers) and thus gives a very narrow glimpse of the reality of equality and human rights enforcement. Given the crucial role these other bodies play in the shared regulatory space, the future realisation of equality and human rights requires us to widen our perspective.
